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Case No. 20080109-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. Deputy Luke's Continuing Detention of Simons Was Not Justified Under 
Wyoming v. Houghton 
The State erroneously proposes that where an officer has probable cause to search 
a vehicle under the automobile exception, particularized suspicion exists as to each 
passenger in the vehicle because "it is reasonable to believe that passengers may be 
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver." Brief of Appellee, p. 12. The State 
cites Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), for 
this proposal. 
The United States Supreme Court in Houghton held that police officers with 
probable cause to search a car may also search passengers' belongings found in the car 
that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307. This 
holding turned on the diminished expectation of privacy that passengers have in the 
property that they choose to transport in cars, and the important governmental interests 
1 
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that would be compromised if officers were precluded from searching passengers' 
belongings. Id. at 304. The Court noted that the governmental interests were high 
because a passenger may be engaged in a common enterprise with a driver, or because a 
criminal may be able to conceal contraband in a passengers' property without the 
passengers' knowledge. Id. at 304. 
However, the Court in Houghton noted that, although the governmental interests 
are high, they do not overcome all interests of the passenger. For example, that important 
governmental interests do not overcome a passenger's interest against searches of his 
person. Id. at 303. The holding in Houghton re-affirmed the longstanding rule that 
probable cause to search a vehicle does not mean that "a person, by mere presence in a 
suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise 
be entitled." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); 
see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303; see also State v. Lopez, 873 P.3d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) 
("one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile"). 
Many cases hold that government interests in effective law enforcement do not 
overcome a passenger's expectation of privacy against detention and investigation for 
criminal activity beyond the legitimate scope of a reasonable traffic stop, unless there is 
particularized suspicion as to that passenger. E.g. State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, j^ 11-13, 
19, 229 P.3d 650; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, | 32, 63 P.3d 650; see also State v. 
Lowe, 2010 UT App 156, ^  8, 234 P.3d 160; State v. Richards, 2009 UT App 397, fflj 8-9, 
224 P.3d 733; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In this 
case, Deputy Luke had no particularized suspicion as to Simons, and thus government 
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interests in effective law enforcement did not overcome Simons' detention beyond the 
scope of Deputy Luke's investigation and arrest of Sorenson. 
The State proposes to give officers the legal authority to detain passengers beyond 
the time incident to the lawful purpose of a traffic stop, without particularized suspicion 
as to those passengers. The weight of legal authority is against this proposal, and this 
Court should reject it. 
II. The State Provides No Meaningful Distinction Between an "Incremental" and 
"Measurable" Extension of a Traffic Stop 
The State also erroneously argues that even if Deputy Luke's detention of Simons 
was not justified under Wyoming v. Houghton, it was justified because the detention 
extended the stop only "incrementally," as opposed to "measurably." Brief of Appellee, 
p. 15. 
For this proposition, the State cites Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 
172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). In Johnson, multiple officers stopped a vehicle for a registration 
violation. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784. While one officer diligently investigated the 
registration violation, a second officer questioned passengers, including the defendant, 
about possible gang membership. Id. at 784-785. As a result of the investigation, a gun 
was ultimately found on the defendant, who was a convicted felon. Id. at 785. The 
defendant's motion to suppress the gun was denied, and the defendant was convicted of 
possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor. Id. at 785. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an officer may inquire into matters 
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, "so long as those inquiries do not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. at 788. Since, the Court held, the officer 
investigating the registration violation did not delay his investigation to facilitate the 
investigation into potential gang membership, the secondary officer's questioning 
concerning potential gang membership was permissible. Id. at 788. 
Johnson does not support the State's position in this case. Unlike the secondary 
officer in Johnson, in this case, Deputy Luke delayed his investigation of Sorenson's 
possible impairment and drug possession to facilitate an investigation of Simons that was 
not supported by individualized suspicion. After Deputy Luke discovered the baggies in 
the driver's side door, he ended his investigation of Sorenson, left Sorenson with the 
trainee officer, and asked Simons whether he had any contraband on his person. R. 92: 8, 
9, 25, 26. 
While, as the State points out, this investigation may have only extended the stop 
by "mere seconds," the State fails to recognize that "mere seconds" constitute the 
measurable extension of a stop that is forbidden. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 32 
(officer's question "Do you have any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the vehicle" held to 
be an impermissible extension of a stop). 
On the same point, the State attempts to distinguish State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
229 P.3d 650, on the grounds that Baker dealt with improper officer questioning that 
occurred after the lawful purpose of the stop was concluded, whereas in this case, 
improper questioning occurred before the lawful purpose of the stop was concluded (i.e., 
before Sorenson was arrested). Brief of Appellee, pp. 15-16. 
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The State errs in attempting to make a distinction between improper questioning 
occurring during and after the stop. In Baker, police officers pulled a vehicle over for a 
broken taillight, and subsequently arrested the driver of the vehicle for driving on a 
suspended license. 2010 UT at Tf 3. The defendant was a passenger in the vehicle, and 
was detained for approximately one minute after the driver had been arrested, without 
reasonable suspicion, so that a dog sniff could be performed on the vehicle. Id. at fflf 4-5. 
As a result of the dog sniff, police discovered that the defendant possessed drugs and 
paraphernalia. Id. at % 5. 
In holding that the defendant was illegally detained after the driver had been 
arrested, the Utah Supreme Court relied on a two part test: 1) "whether the police 
officer's action was justified at its inception", and 2) "whether the detention following the 
stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the detention in 
the first place." Baker, 2010 UT at f^ 12 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
The Court held that the defendant's detention failed under the second prong, 
because the dog sniff was not reasonably related in scope to the investigation of the 
broken taillight or the driver's suspended license. Id. at f 14. There was no suggestion in 
Baker, or any of the cases it relied on, that the outcome would have been any different if 
the officers had intentionally delayed the arrest of the driver so that it could be 
technically completed after the dog sniff had been performed. See id. at ^ 12 (citing State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 (holding that an officer can run a warrant check on a car 
during a legal traffic stop if doing so does not significantly extend the period of detention 
beyond that reasonably necessary to request defendant's license and registration and to 
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issue a citation)). Neither should the police be permitted to temporarily halt investigation 
or arrest of the driver to investigate the passenger with honest intent to return to the 
justified arrest once the slight detour is completed. 
In this case, Deputy Luke's individual detention of Simons was not reasonably 
related in scope to his investigation of Sorenson for DUI and drug possession. The 
illegality of the detention is no different under these circumstances than it would have 
been if Deputy Luke had arrested Sorenson and afterward returned to investigate Simons 
without reasonable suspicion. Under either set of circumstances, the question is whether 
the detention was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place." Hansen, 2002 UT at ^ 29 (internal quotation omitted). In 
this case, where Deputy Luke did not have particularized suspicion as to Simons, it was 
not. 
Thus, the State errs in arguing that Deputy Hansen's question to Simons about 
whether Simons had any contraband on his person did not measurably extend the stop. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's denial of Simons' motion to suppress, and 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions that Simons' plea may be 
withdrawn. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011. 
DOUGiA^J. THOMPSON 
MATTHEW R. MORRISE 
Counsel for Appellant 
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